"In studying the action of the Analytical Engine, we find that the peculiar and independent nature of the considerations which in all mathematical analysis belong to operations, as distinguished from the objects operated upon and from the results of the operations performed upon those objects, is very strikingly defined and separated.
It is well to draw attention to this point, not only because its full appreciation is essential to the attainment of any very just and adequate general comprehension of the powers and mode of action of the Analytical Engine, but also because it is one which is perhaps too little kept in view in the study of mathematical science in general. It is, however, impossible to confound it with other considerations, either when we trace the manner in which that engine attains its results, or when we prepare the data for its attainment of those results. It were much to be desired, that when mathematical processes pass through the human brain instead of through the medium of inanimate mechanism, it were equally a necessity of things that the reasonings connected with operations should hold the same just place as a clear and well-defined branch of the subject of analysis, a fundamental but yet independent ingredient in the science, which they must do in studying the engine. The confusion, the difficulties, the contradictions which, in consequence of a want of accurate distinctions in this particular, have up to even a recent period encumbered mathematics in all those branches involving the consideration of negative and impossible quantities, will at once occur to the reader who is at all versed in this science, and would alone suffice to justify dwelling somewhat on the point, in connexion with any subject so peculiarly fitted to give forcible illustration of it as the Analytical Engine. It may be desirable to explain, that by the word operation, we mean any process which alters the mutual relation of two or more things, be this relation of what kind it may. This is the most general definition, and would include all subjects in the universe."
"The operating mechanism can even be thrown into action independently of any object to operate upon (although of course no result could then be developed). Again, it might act upon other things besides number, were objects found whose mutual fundamental relations could be expressed by those of the abstract science of operations, and which should be also susceptible of adaptations to the action of the operating notation and mechanism of the engine. Supposing, for instance, that the fundamental relations of pitched sounds in the science of harmony and of musical composition were susceptible of such expression and adaptations, the engine might compose elaborate and scientific pieces of music of any degree of complexity or extent."
"The Analytical Engine is an embodying of the science of operations, constructed with peculiar reference to abstract number as the subject of those operations."
"Those who view mathematical science, not merely as a vast body of abstract and immutable truths, whose intrinsic beauty, symmetry and logical completeness, when regarded in their connexion together as a whole, entitle them to a prominent place in the interest of all profound and logical minds, but as possessing a yet deeper interest for the human race, when it is remembered that this science constitutes the language through which alone we can adequately express the great facts of the natural world, and those unceasing changes of mutual relationship which, visibly or invisibly, consciously or unconsciously to our immediate physical perceptions, are interminably going on in the agencies of the creation we live amidst: those who thus think on mathematical truth as the instrument through which the weak mind of man can most effectually read his Creator's works, will regard with especial interest all that can tend to facilitate the translation of its principles into explicit practical forms."
"The distinctive characteristic of the Analytical Engine, and that which has rendered it possible to endow mechanism with such extensive faculties as bid fair to make this engine the executive right-hand of abstract algebra, is the introduction into it of the principle which Jacquard devised for regulating, by means of punched cards, the most complicated patterns in the fabrication of brocaded stuffs. It is in this that the distinction between the two engines lies. Nothing of the sort exists in the Difference Engine. We may say most aptly, that the Analytical Engine weaves algebraical patterns just as the Jacquard-loom weaves flowers and leaves."
"The bounds of arithmetic were however outstepped the moment the idea of applying the cards had occurred; and the Analytical Engine does not occupy common ground with mere â€œcalculating machines.â€ It holds a position wholly its own; and the considerations it suggests are most interesting in their nature. In enabling mechanism to combine together general symbols in successions of unlimited variety and extent, a uniting link is established between the operations of matter and the abstract mental processes of the most abstract branch of mathematical science. A new, a vast, and a powerful language is developed for the future use of analysis, in which to wield its truths so that these may become of more speedy and accurate practical application for the purposes of mankind than the means hitherto in our possession have rendered possible. Thus not only the mental and the material, but the theoretical and the practical in the mathematical world, are brought into more intimate and effective connexion with each other. We are not aware of its being on record that anything partaking in the nature of what is so well designated the Analytical Engine has been hitherto proposed, or even thought of, as a practical possibility, any more than the idea of a thinking or of a reasoning machine."
"The machine then works upon these as its data. But these data must themselves have been already computed through a series of calculations by a human head. Therefore that engine can only produce results depending on data which have been arrived at by the explicit and actual working out of processes that are in their nature different from any that come within the sphere of its own powers. In other words, an analysing process must have been gone through by a human mind in order to obtain the data upon which the engine then synthetically builds its results. The Difference Engine is in its character exclusively synthetical, while the Analytical Engine is equally capable of analysis or of synthesis."
"To this it may be replied, that an analysing process must equally have been performed in order to furnish the Analytical Engine with the necessary operative data; and that herein may also lie a possible source of error. "
"Those who incline to very strictly utilitarian views may perhaps feel that the peculiar powers of the Analytical Engine bear upon questions of abstract and speculative science, rather than upon those involving every-day and ordinary human interests. These persons being likely to possess but little sympathy, or possibly acquaintance, with any branches of science which they do not find to be useful (according to their definition of that word), may conceive that the undertaking of that engine, now that the other one is already in progress, would be a barren and unproductive laying out of yet more money and labour; in fact, a work of supererogation. Even in the utilitarian aspect, however, we do not doubt that very valuable practical results would be developed by the extended faculties of the Analytical Engine; some of which results we think we could now hint at, had we the space; and others, which it may not yet be possible to foresee, but which would be brought forth by the daily increasing requirements of science, and by a more intimate practical acquaintance with the powers of the engine, were it in actual existence."
"The power of repeating the cards, alluded to by M. Menabrea, and more fully explained in Note C., reduces to an immense extent the number of cards required. It is obvious that this mechanical improvement is especially applicable wherever cycles occur in the mathematical operations, and that, in preparing data for calculations by the engine, it is desirable to arrange the order and combination of the processes with a view to obtain them as much as possible symmetrically and in cycles, in order that the mechanical advantages of the backing system may be applied to the utmost. It is here interesting to observe the manner in which the value of an analytical resource is met and enhanced by an ingenious mechanical contrivance."
"We shall now draw further attention to the fact, already noticed, of its being by no means necessary that a formula proposed for solution should ever have been actually worked out, as a condition for enabling the engine to solve it. Provided we know the series of operations to be gone through, that is sufficient. In the foregoing instance this will be obvious enough on a slight consideration. And it is a circumstance which deserves particular notice, since herein may reside a latent value of such an engine almost incalculable in its possible ultimate results. We already know that there are functions whose numerical value it is of importance for the purposes both of abstract and of practical science to ascertain, but whose determination requires processes so lengthy and so complicated, that, although it is possible to arrive at them through great expenditure of time, labour and money, it is yet on these accounts practically almost unattainable; and we can conceive there being some results which it may be absolutely impossible in practice to attain with any accuracy, and whose precise determination it may prove highly important for some of the future wants of science, in its manifold, complicated and rapidly-developing fields of inquiry, to arrive at."
"It is desirable to guard against the possibility of exaggerated ideas that might arise as to the powers of the Analytical Engine. In considering any new subject, there is frequently a tendency, first, to overrate what we find to be already interesting or remarkable; and, secondly, by a sort of natural reaction, to undervalue the true state of the case, when we do discover that our notions have surpassed those that were really tenable.
The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipating any analytical relations or truths. Its province is to assist us in making available what we are already acquainted with. This it is calculated to effect primarily and chiefly of course, through its executive faculties; but it is likely to exert an indirect and reciprocal influence on science itself in another manner. For, in so distributing and combining the truths and the formulÃ¦ of analysis, that they may become most easily and rapidly amenable to the mechanical combinations of the engine, the relations and the nature of many subjects in that science are necessarily thrown into new lights, and more profoundly investigated. This is a decidedly indirect, and a somewhat speculative, consequence of such an invention. It is however pretty evident, on general principles, that in devising for mathematical truths a new form in which to record and throw themselves out for actual use, views are likely to be induced, which should again react on the more theoretical phase of the subject. There are in all extensions of human power, or additions to human knowledge, various collateral influences, besides the main and primary object attained."
"Advocates position Digital Humanities as a corrective to the “traditional” and outmoded approaches to literary study that supposedly plague English departments. Like much of the rhetoric surrounding Silicon Valley today, this discourse sees technological innovation as an end in itself and equates the development of disruptive business models with political progress. Yet despite the aggressive promotion of Digital Humanities as a radical insurgency, its institutional success has for the most part involved the displacement of politically progressive humanities scholarship and activism in favor of the manufacture of digital tools and archives. Advocates characterize the development of such tools as revolutionary and claim that other literary scholars fail to see their political import due to fear or ignorance of technology. But the unparalleled level of material support that Digital Humanities has received suggests that its most significant contribution to academic politics may lie in its (perhaps unintentional) facilitation of the neoliberal takeover of the university."
"Thus, Digital Humanities was born from disdain and at times outright contempt, not just for humanities scholarship, but for the standards, procedures, and claims of leading literary scholars. Those scholars had told the Humanities Computing specialists, even if only implicitly, that their work didn’t count as scholarship. Now, it was time to prove them wrong. The goal was not merely to show what technical expertise could bring to humanities research. Rather, it was to redefine what had been formerly classified as <i>support functions for the humanities as the very model of good humanities scholarship</i>. "
"It is indicative of the Digital Humanities movement’s general disdain for scholarship as it had hitherto been defined that arguments making as little sense as Dalvean’s can appear in leading Digital Humanities journals, with the result that much of the more interesting side of Digital Humanities research has a tendency to resemble a slapdash form of computational linguistics adorned with theoretical claims that would never pass muster within computational linguistics itself."
"We have presented these tendencies as signs that the Digital Humanities as social and institutional movement is a reactionary force in literary studies, pushing the discipline toward post-interpretative, non-suspicious, technocratic, conservative, managerial, lab-based practice."
"What it stands in opposition to, rather, is <i>the insistence that academic work should be critical</i>, and that there is, after all, no work and no way to be in the world that is not political."
"In the academy and outside of it, the privileging of technical expertise above other forms of knowledge is a political gesture, and one that has proved highly effective in neutralizing critique of established power relations. We offer our analysis of the Digital Humanities social movement as a way of resisting that gesture and as an inducement to other scholars to do the same."
"Aesthesis, as will become clear in the pages ahead, is the term by which I refer to a theory of partial, situated, and subjective knowledge-a theory whose aims are ideological as well as epistemological." p0
"The concept of aesthesis engages basic questions about knowledge and its representation, and interpretative acts and the values assigned to them within a cultural frame. Insofar as form allows sens to appear to sentience, to paraphrase Aristotle, the role of aesthetics is to illuminate the ways in which the forms of knowledge provoke interpretation. Insofar as the formal logic computational environments validates instrumental applications regarding the management and creation of digital artifacts, imaginative play is crucial to keeping that logic from asserting a totalizing authority on knowledge and its forms. Aesthesis, I suggest, allows us to insist on the value of subjectivity that is central to aesthetic artifacts - works of art in the traditional sense - and to place that subjectivity at the core of knowledge production." p0
"In a curious historical coincidence, the very era that witnessed the dismantling of truth claims by poststructuralist practice and deconstructive theory witnessed the rise of the cultural authority of computational media. Digital technology has insinuated itself into the infrastructure and rituals that form the basis of daily life to such an extent that, despite the availability of a philosophical base for undoing its authority, there is a pervasive tendency to bracket any critiques in the interest of getting on with business. Nowhere was this contradiction more evident than in the struggles to keep humanistic theory central to the digital humanities. Time after time, we saw theoretical understandings subordinated to the practical "requirements of computational protocols." As one of my digital humanities colleagues used to remark, we would go into the technical discussions as deconstructed relativists and come out as empirically oriented pragmatists." p0
"The event of interpretation in a digital environment includes many steps: creating a model of knowledge, encoding it for representation, embodying it in a material expression, and finally encountering it in a scene of interpetation. Each is a part of a performative system governed by basic principles of second-generation systems theory, in particular, codependence and emergence. These can be used to describe an aesthetic experience grounded in subjective judgement just as surely as they can be used to describe formal systems." p0-0
"Computational methods rooted in formal logic tend to be granted more authority in this dialogue than methods grounded in subjective judgement. But speculative computing inverts this power relation, stressing the need for humanities tools in digital environments." p0
"The stability of construction of fairy tales permits a hypothetical <i>definition</i> of them which may be stated in the following way: a fairy tale is a story built upon the proper alternation of the above-cited functions in various forms, with some of them absent from each story and with others repeated." p0
"<p>Furthermore, because the computer is, as we will see, dynamically reconfigurable by design, it can in turn be augmented with new intelligence. Computing machines and scholarly intelligence change each other, recursively...
What can this recursive machine do with text that is worthy of your notice? Let me propose the following features which make a genuine difference. Chief among these is (1) the automation which brings the timescale of forbiddingly laborious tasks within normal human bounds. From this fact of temporal advantage the rest can be derived. In particular, (2) the capacity to store and retrieve amounts of text large enough to permit access to and processing of unread but relevant material gives us the automated digital library, which remains and objective of research. On the theoretical site is (3) the conceptual language and ultimately software which gives us as standard, communicable way of describing processes of interest to us and of testing the descriptions, then implementing and distributing them. In consequence of the rigours of using this language, which requires complete and explicit specification, there arises (4) the struggle to articulate what normally goes without saying in our editions and editing practices. The mutability if not instability of the digital medium results in (5) the strong tendency for scholarship produced with it toward the conversational, improvisational and experimental. Hence, (6) the world-wide communications network implied by the above has developed, and is a necessity for exchange of scholarship at a pace commensurate with experimental, often collaborative work.
"The theory to be presented here is concerned with a class of 'brain models' called <i>perceptrons</i>. By 'brain model' we shall mean any theoretical system which attempts to explain the psychological functioning of a brain in terms of known laws of physics and mathematics, and known facts of neuroanatomy and physiology. A brain model may actually be constructed in physical form, as an aid to determining its logical potentialities and performance; this, however, is not an essential feauture of the model approach. The essence of a theoretical model is that it is a system with known properties, readily amenable to analysis, which is hypothesized to embody the essential features of a system with unknown or ambiguous properties - in the present case, the biological brain... Perceptrons are of interest because their study appears to throw light upon the biophysics of cognitive systems: they illustrate, in rudimentary form, some of the processes by which organisms, or other suitably organized entities, may come to possess 'knowledge' of the physical world in which they exist, and by which the knowledge that they possess can be represented or reported when occassion demands. The theory of the perceptron shows how such knowledge depends upon the organization of the environment, as well as on the perceiving system." p3
"A perceptron consists of a set of signal generating units (or 'neurons') connected together to form a network. Each of these units, upon receiving a suitable output signal (either from other units in the network or from the environment) responds by generating an output signal, which may be transmitted, through connections, to a selected set of receiving units. Each perceptron includes a sensory input (i.e., a set of units capable of responding to signals emanating from the environment) and one or more output units, which generate signals which can be directly observed by an experimenter, or by an automatic control mechanism. The logical properties of a perceptron are defined by:
1. Its <i>topological organization</i> (ie, the connections among signal units);
2. A set of <i>signal propagation functions</i>, or rules governing the generation and transmission of signals;
3. A set of <i>memory functions</i> or rules for modification of the network properties as a consequence of activity." p4
"At the time that the first perceptron model was proposed, the writer was primarily concerned with the problem of memory storage in biological systems, and particularly with finding a mechanism which would account for the 'distributed memory' and 'equipotentiality' phenomena found by Lashley and others (Refs. 48, 49, 95). It soon became clear that the problem of memory mechanisms could not be divorced from a consideration fo what it is that is remembered, and as a consequence the perceptrong became a model of a more general cognitive system, concerned with both memory and perception." p4
"At first glance, the ability of formal processing to manage complex expressions either by modelling or manipulation appeared to be mere expediency. But computational methods are not simply a means to an end. They are a powerful change agent setting the terms of a cultural shift.
"By contrast, speculative computing is not just a game played to create projects with uncertain outcomes, but a set of principles through which to push back on the cultural authority by which computational methods instrumentalize their effects across many disciplines. The villain, if such a simplistic character must be brought on stage, is not formal logic or computational protocols, but the way the terms of such operations are used to justify decisions about administration and management of cultural and imaginitive life based on the presumption of objectivity. The terms on which digital humanities had been established, while essential for the realization of projects and goals, needed to be scrutinized with an eye to the discipline's alignment with such managerial methods. As in any ideological formation, unexamined assumptions are able to pass as natural. We defined speculative computing to push subjective and probabilistic concepts of knowledge as experience (partial, situated, and subjective) against objective and mechanistic claims for knowledge as information (total, managed, and externalized)." p5
"A first type of book is the root-book. The tree is already the image of the world, or the root image of the world-tree. This is the classic book, as noble, signifying, and subjective organic interiority (the strata of the book). The book imitates the world as art imitates nature: by procedures specific to it that accomplish what nature cannot or can no longer do. The law of the book is the law of reflection, the One that becomes two. How could the law of the book reside in nature, when it is what presides over the very division between world and book, nature and art? One becomes two: whenever we encounter this formula, even stated strategically by Mao or understood in the most 'dialectical' way possible, what we have before us is the most classical and well reflected, oldest, and weariest kind of thought. Nature doesn't work that way: in nature, roots are taproots with a more multiple, lateral, and circular system of ramification, rather than a dichotomous one. Thought lags behind nature. Even the book as a natural reality is a taproot, with its pivotal spine and surrounding leaves." p5
"All these texts, which are doubtless the interminable preface to another text that one day I would like to have the force to write, or still the epigraph to another that I would never have the audacity to write, are only the commentary on the sentence about a labyrinth of ciphers that is the epigraph to <i>Speech and Phenomena</i>...<sup>5</sup> [5. T.N. The epigraph reads: "A name on being mentioned reminds us of the Dresden Gallery and of our last visit there: we wander through the rooms, and stand before a picture of Tenier's which represents a picture gallery. When we consider that pictures of the latter would in turn portray pictures which on their part exhibited readable inscriptions and so forth..." Husserl, <i>Ideas</i>, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p.270.]" p5
"A translation always communicates an interpretation, a foreign text that is partial and altered, supplemented with features peculiar to the translating language, no longer inscrutably foreign but made comprehensible in a distinctively domestic style. Translations, in other words, inevitably perform a work of domestication. Those that work best, the most powerful in recreating cultural values and the most responsible in accounting for that power, usually engage readers in domestic terms that have been defamiliarized to some extent, made fascinating by a revisionary encounter with a foreign text." p5
"Should the small, glyphic figures in William Blake's handwriting that appear within his lines of powety be considered part of the text, or simply disregarded because they cannot be rendered as ASCII symbols? At every stage of development, digital instruments require such decisions. And through these decisions, and the interpretive acts they entail, our digital cultural legacy is shaped.
"Because of this intense engagement with interpretation and epistemological questions, the field of digital humanities extends the theoretical questions that came into focus in deconstruction, postmodern theory, critical and cultural studies, adn other theoretical inquiries of recent decades. Basic concerns about the ways prcesses of interpretation constitute their objects within cultural and historical fields of inquiry are raised again, and with another level of historical baggage and cultural charge attached. What does it mean to create ordering systems, models of knowledge and use, or environments for aggregation or consensus? Who will determine how knowledge is classified in digital representations? The next phase of cultural power struggles will be embodied in digital instruments that model what we think we know and what we can imagine.
"Digital humanities is an applied field as well as a theoretical one, and the task of applying these metaconsiderations puts humanists' assumptions to a different set of tests. It also raises the stakes with regard to outcomes." p6
"The radicle-system, or fascicular root, is the second figure of the book, to which our modernity pays willing allegiance. This time, the principal root has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; an immediate, indefinite multiplicity of secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development. This time, natural reality is what aborts the principal root, but the root's unity subsists, as past or yet to come, as possible." p6
"To "deconstruct" philosophy, thus, would be to think - in the most faithful, interior way - the structured genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time to determine - from a certain exterior that is unqualifiable or unnameable by philosophy - what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into a history by means of this somewhere motivated representation." p6
"Already we have had to delineate <i>that differance is not,</i> does not exist, is not a present-being (<i>on</i>) in any form; and we will be led to delineate also everything <i>that</i> it <i>is not,</i> that is <i>everything;</i> and consequently that it has neither existence nor essence. It derives from no category of being, whether present or absent." p6
"What Kafka would write in French can be no more than another French interpretation, not a rendering more faithful or adequate to the German text. The fact that the author is the interpreter doesn't make the interpretation unmediated by the target-language values." p6
"Electrophysiology of the central nervous system indicates in brief that the brain is continuously active, in all its parts, and an afferent excitation must be superimposed on an already existent excitation. It is therefore impossible that the consequence of a sensory event should often be uninfluenced by the pre-existent activity." p7
"<i>First, differance</i> refers to the (active <i>and</i> passive) movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving. In this sense, <i>differance</i> is not preceded by the originary and indivisible unity of a present possibility that I could reserve, like an expenditure that I would put off calculatedly or for reasons of economy." p8
"The encounter of texts and digital media has reinforced theoreticalrealizations that printed materials are not static, self-identical artifacts and that the act of reading and interpretation is a performative intervention in a textual field that is charged with potentiality. One of the challenges we set ourselves was to envision ways to <i>show</i> this dramatically rather than simply to assert it as a critical insight." p9
"There are at least two basic points, which are fundamental to a theory of brain functioning, on which most of the present-day theorists seem to be in agreement. First is the assumption that the essential properties of the brain are the topology and the dynamics of impulse-propogation in a network of nerve cells, or neurons. This has been contested by a few theorists who hold that the individual cells and their properties are less important than the bulk properties and electrical currents in the cortical medium as a whole (c.f. Kohler, Ref 45)... It will be assumed that the essential features of the brain can be derived in principle from a knowledge of the connections and states of the neurons which comprise it. Secondly, there is general agreement that the information-handling capabilities of biological networks do not depend upon any specifically vitalistic powers which could not be duplicated by man-made devices... Nonetheless, all currently known properties of a nerve cell can be simulated electronically with readily available devices. It is significant that the indivicual elements, or cells, of a nerve network have never been demonstrated to possess any specifically psychological functions, such as 'memory', 'awareness', or 'intelligence'. Such properties, therefore, presumably reside in the organization and functioning of the network as a whole, rather than in its elementary parts." p9
"<i>Second</i>, the movement of <i>differance</i>, as that which produces different things that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as, to take only a few examples, sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture, etc. As a common root, <i>differance</i> is also the element of the <i>same</i> (to be distinguished from the identical) in which these oppositions are announced. <i>Third, differance</i> is also the production, if it can still be put this way, of these differences, of the diacriticity that the linguistics generated by Saussure, and all the structrual sciences modeled upon it, have recalled is the condition for any signification and any structure. These differences - and, for example, the taxonomical science which they may occassion - are the effects of <i>differance</i>; they are neither inscribed in the heavens, nor in the brain, which does not mean that they are produced by the activity of some speaking subject. From this point of view, the concept of <i>differance</i> is neither simply structuralist, nor simply geneticist, such an alternative itself being and "effect" of <i>differance</i>. " p9
"What is considered data - that is, what is available for analysis - is as substantive a consideration as what is revealed by its analysis." p10
"There are two radical modifications of earlier ideas: transmission is not simply linear but apparently always involves some closed or recurrent circuits; and a single impulse cannot ordinarily cross a synapse-two or more must act simultaneously, and two or more afferent fibres must therefore be active in order to excite a third to which they lead." p10
"In a single system, and with a constant set of connections between neurons in the system, the direction in whicy an entering excitation will be conducted may be completely dependent on the timing of other excitations. Connections are necessary but may not be decisive in themselves; in a complex system, especially, time factors must always influence the direction of conduction." p10-11
"Circulating among diverse cultural constituencies and social institutions, these forms are positioned hierarchically, with the standard dialect in dominance but subject to constant variation from regional or group dialects, jargons cliches and slogans, stylistic innovations, nonce words, and the sheer accumulation of previous uses. Any language use is thus a site of power relationships because a language, at any historical moment, is a specific conjuncture of a major form holding sway over minor variables. Lecercle (1990) calls them the 'remainder'. The linguistic variations released by the remainder do not merely exceed any communicative act, but frustrate any effort to formulate systematic rules. The remainder subverts the major form by revealing it to be socially and historically situated,... " p10
"English is the most translated language worldwide, but one of the least translated into (Venuti 1995a: 12-14),..." p10
"This translation ethics does not so much prevent the assimilation of the foreign text as aim to signify the autonomous existence of that text behind (yet by means of) the assimilative process of the translation." p11
"It is hoped that network which consists of neruon-like elements, and is capable of computing the required functions, will be found to resemble a biological nerve-net in its organization and the computational principles employed." p12
"Insofar as minoritizing translation relies on discursive heterogeneity, it pursues an experimentalism that would seem to narrow its audience and contradict the democratic agenda I have sketched. Experimental form demands a high aesthetic mode of appreciation, the critical detachment and educated competence associated with the cultural elite, whereas the communicative function of language is emphasized by the popular aesthetic..." p12
"Yet translation that takes a popular approach to the foreign text isn't necessarily democratic. The popular aesthetic requires fluent translations that produce the illusory effect of transparency, and this means adhering to the current standard dialect while avoiding any dialect, register, or style that calls attention to words as words and therefore preempts the reader's identification." p12
"The heterogeneous discourse of minoritizing translation resists this assimilationist ethic by signifying the linguistic and cultural differences of the text - within the major language. The hetergeneity needn't be so alienating as to frustrate a popular approach completely; if the remainder is released at significant points in a translation that is generally readable, the reader's participation will be disrupted only momentarily. Moreover, a strategic use of minority elements can remain intelligible to a wide range of readers and so increase the possibility that the translation will cross the boundaries between cultural constituencies, even it if comes to signify different meanings in different groups." p12
"The fundamental thesis of the McCulloch-Pitts theory is that all psychological phenomena can be analyzed and understood in terms of activity in a network of two-state (all-or-nothing) logical devices... Despite teh apparent adherence to an outdated atomistic psychological approach, there is an important contribution in the recognition that the proposed axiomatic representation of neural elements and their properties permits strict logical analysis of arbitrarily complicated networks of such elements, and that such networks are capable of representing any logical proposition whatever." p13
"The rhizome is altogether different, a <i>map not a tracing</a>. Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What disinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps one fo the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways; in this sense, the burrow is an animal rhizome, and sometimes maintains a clear distinction between the line of flight as passageway and storage or living strata (cf. the muskrat). A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back "to the same." The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged "competence."" p13-14
"Language is a system of signs that express ideas, and is therefore comparable to a system of writing, the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic rites, polite formulas, military signals, etc. But it is the most important of all these systems.
<i>A science that studies the life of signs within society</i> is conceivable; it would be part of a social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it <i>semiology</i> (from Greek sēmeîon 'sign'). Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only part of the general science of semiology; the laws discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of anthropological facts." p16
"Thought is not arborescent, and the brain is not a rooted or ramified matter. What are wrongly called "dendrites" do not assure the connection of neurons in a continuous fabric. The discontinuity between cells, the role of the axons, the functioning of the synapses, the existence of synaptic microfissures, the leap each message makes across these fissures, make the brain a multiplicity immersed in its plane of consistency or neuroglia, a whole uncertain, probabilistic system ("the uncertain nervous system"). Many people have a tree growing in their heads, but the brain itself is much more a grass than a tree. "The axon and the dendrite twist around each other like bindweed around brambles, with synapses at each of the thorns."<sup>12</sup> The same goes for memory. Neurologists and psychophysiologists distinguish between long-term memory and short-term memory (on the order of a minute). The difference between them is not simply quantitative: short-term memory is of the rhizome or diagram type, and long-term memory is arborescent and centralized (imprint, engram, tracing, or photograph). Short-term memory is in no way subject to a law of contiguity or immediacy to its object; it can act at a distance, come or return a long time after, but always under conditions of discontinuity, rupture, and multiplicity. Furthermore, the difference between the two kinds of memory is not that of two temporal modes of apprehending the same thing; they do not grasp the same thing, memory, or idea. the splendor of the short-term Idea: one writes using short-term memory, and thus short-term ideas, even if one reads or rereads using long-term memory of long-term concepts. Short-term memory includes forgetting as a process; it merges not with the instant but instead with the nervous, temporal, and collective rhizome. Long-term memory (family, race, society, or civilization) traces and translates, but what it translates continues to act in it, from a distance, off beat, in an "untimely" way, not instantaneously." p17
"Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory - PRECESSION OF SIMULACRA - it is the map that engenders the territory and if we were to revive the fable today, it would be the territory whose shreds are slowly rotting across the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges subsist here and there, in the deserts which are no longer those of the Empire, but our own. <i>The desert of the real itself.</i>" p20
"Hebb (Ref. 33) and Hayek (Ref. 32), following the tradition of James Stuart Mill and Helmholtz, have attempted to show how an organism can acquire perceptual capabilities through a maturational process... Hebb's model is more detailed in its biological description, and suggests a process by which neurons which are frequently activated together become linked into functional organizations called 'cell assemblies' and 'phase sequences' which, when stimulated, correspond to the evocation of an elementary idea or percept." p22
"Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a rhizome: unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to to traites of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, foru, five, etc. It is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which One is added (n+1). It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted (n-1). When a multiplicity of this kind changes dimension, it necessarily changes in nature as well, undergoes a metamorphosis. Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deteritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature. These lines, or lineaments, should not be confused with lineages of the arborescent type, which are merely localizable linkages between poitns and positions. Unlike the tree, the rhizome is not the object of reproduction: neither external reproduction as image-tree nor internal reproduction as tree-structure. The rhizome is an antigenealogy. It is a short-term memory, or antimemory. The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots. Unlike the graphic arts, drawing or photography, unlike tracings, the rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight. It is tracings that must be put on the map, not the opposite. In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentred nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states. What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality - but also to the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial - that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of "becomings"." p23-24
"The use of a digital compuer by Rochester and associates was mentioned above in connection with Hebb's model. Simulation of a statistically connected network to investigate possible learning capabilities was first carried out successfully by Farley and Clark in 1954 (Ref. 10)." p24
"Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that it is the 'real' country, all of 'real' America, which <i>is</i> Disnelyand (just as prisons are there to conceal the fact that it is the social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, which is carceral). Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation. It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle." p25
"Computational form, which accepts only that which can be told with programmatic explicitness and precision, is thus radically inadequate for representing the full range of knowledge – hence useful for isolating what gets lost when we try to specify the unspecifiable." p25
"A contribution of considerable methodological significance was Ashby's 'Design for a Brain', in 1952 (Ref. 3). While Ashby's work (despite its title) does not specify an actual brain model in our present sense, it develops the rationale for an analysis of closed systems which must include the environment as well as the responding organism and rules of interaction as the object of study." p25
"There are in general two ways in which a model may violate expectations and so surprise us: either by a success we cannot explain, e.g. finding an occurrence where it should not be; or by a like-wise inexplicable failure, e.g. not finding one where it is clearly present to our own perception. In both cases modelling problematizes. As a tool of research, then, modelling succeeds intellectually when it results in failure, either directly within the model itself or indirectly through ideas it shows to be inadequate. This failure, in the sense of expectations violated, is fundamental to modelling, as we will see." p26
"It is a question, rather, of producing a new concept of writing. This concept can be called <i>gram</i> or <i>differance</i>. The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be <i>present</i> in and of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each "element"-phoneme or grapheme-being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this textile, is the <i>text</i> produced only in the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only everywhere, differences and traces of traces." p26
"I conclude that although efficient access to data is an essential function of computing, the greater potential is for computers as modelling machines, not knowledge jukeboxes. To think of them as only the latter is profoundly to mis-understand human knowledge." p27
"Modelling of something readily turns into modelling for better or more detailed knowledge of it; similarly, the knowledge gained from realizing a model for something feeds or can feed into an improved version. This characteristic blurring of design into use and use into (re)design is what denies modelling of any sense of closure. Modelling for, utopian by definition, is denied it in any case." p27
"The gram as <i>differance</i>, then is a structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the basis of the opposition presence/absence. <i>Differance></i> is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the <i>spacing</i> by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the <i>a</i> of <i>differance</i> indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the "full" terms would not signify, would not function." p27
"Here I propose to examine them, using as my touchstone the continual process of coming to know by manipulating things, not an achievement but an approximating convergence." p28
"Perceptrons are not intended to serve as detailed copies of any actual nervous system. They are simplified networks, designed to permit the study of lawful relationships between the organization of a nerve net, the organization of its environment, and the 'psychological' performances of which the network is capable... they represent extreme simplifications of the central nervous system, in which some properties are exaggerated, others suppressed... The main strength of this approach is that it permits meaningful questions to be asked and answered about particular types of organization, hypothetical memory mechanisms, and neuron models." p28
"In the last chapter a methodological doctrine was proposed, which undertakes to evaluate classes of brainlike systems by comparing their performance with that of biological subjects in behavioral experiments; by gradually increasing the sophistication and varying the axiomatic constraints which define the experimental systems, it is hoped that models which closely resemble the biological prototype can ultimately be acheived... What are the parametric constraints, functional properties, and performance criteria which must be met, in order to acheive a model which is a plausible representation of the brain?" p29
"Two main types of synapses are recognized: excitatory and inhibitory. It is generally assumed, although it has not been proven, that a single neuron is either all excitatory or all inhibitory, in its effect upon post-synaptic cells." p32
"Essentially, the currently accepted concept is that the dendritic structure and cell body jointly act as an integrating system, in which a series of incoming signals interact to establish a pre-firing state in a region at the base of the axon, from which impulses originate. If this pre-firing state reaches a threshold level (presumably measured by membrance depolarization) at a point within the critical region, a spike potential is initiated, and spreads without decrement along the axon... Successions of impulses arriving at the same synapse can sometimes cause an increase in the sensistivity of the receiving membrane (faciliation) and can sometimes cause a progressive diminution in sensitivity (Ref. 11). There is evidence to suggest that different local patches of surface membrane are differently specialized, and respond in different ways to impulses received, even within the same neuron. Some of these regions appear to act as sources of internally generated signals, which may lead to spontaneous activity of the neuron, and the emission of spike impulses without any input signals from outside the cell." p32
"The arrival of a single (excitatory) impulse gives rise to a partial depolarization of the post-synaptic membrane surface, which spreads over an appreciable area, and decays exponentially with time. This is called a local excitatory state (l.e.s). The l.e.s. due to successive impulses is (approximately) additive. Several impulses arriving in sufficiently close succession may thus combine to touch off an impulse in the receiving neuron if the local excitatory state at the base of the axon achieves the threshold level. This phenomenon is called <i>temporal summation</i>. Similarly, impulses which arrive at different points on the cell body or on the dendrites may combine by <i>spatial summation</i> to trigger an impulse if the l.e.s induced at the base of the axon is strong enough." p33-34
"The human brain consists of some 10<sup>10</sup> neurons of all types. These are arranged in a network which receives inputs from receptor neurons at one end, and conveys signals to the effector neurons at the output end." p35
"The general picture of the nervous system, then, is one of a large set of signal generators, each having one or more outputs, on which nerve impulses may appear. These impulses may vary in frequency, and to some extent in amplitude, but seem to carry information mainly in pulse-coded form." p35
"Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible." p38
"Simulation is infinitely more dangerous, however, since it always suggests, over and above its object, that <i>law and order themselves might really be nothing more than simulation.</i>" p38
"A typical cell in the cerebral cortex receives input connections from some hundreds of other cells, which may be located in widely scattered regions, but its output is more likely to be transmitted to a relatively localized region. Cells which receive sensory input signals are likely to have a restricted field of origins in a sensory surface, such as the retina or the skin." p38
"<p>But that does not mean that one has to be 'for' or 'against' the Enlightenment. It even means precisely that one has to refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism (this is considered a positive term by some and used by others on the contrary, as a reproach); or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality (which may be seen once again as good or bad). Adn we do not break free of this blackmail by introducing 'dialectical' nuances while seeking to determine what good and bad elements there may have been in the Enlightenment.
We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment. Such an analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as possible; and these inquiries will not be oriented retrospectively toward the 'essential kernel of rationality' that can be found in the Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented toward the 'contemporary limits of the necessary,' that is, toward what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects.
"In contrast to the highly specific regional organization in the gross anatomy of the sensory projection areas of the cortex, the detailed microstructure of the network appears to be essentially random, governed only by directional gradients and preferences, and statistical distributions of fiber lengths for variou types of cells (see Sholl, Ref.93). In the human nervous system, it appears that the most specific and constrained topological organizations are to be found in the sensory and motor systems, while the intervening association network of the CNS is less tightly controlled in its organization, presumably depending more on learning and adaptive modification to establish the required pathways and linkages." p39
"One feature which is of particular importance for brain models is the apparent plasticity of localization in the 'association areas' (or 'intrinsic systems', to use the terminology advocated by Primbram) in contrast to the relatively fixed and irreplaceable character of the sensory and motor tracts." p41
"In their most basic, ‘primordial’ condition (ursprünglich), Heidegger declares, entities are known in the totality of our use or interaction with them. When a tool is in use, in the state Heidegger calls ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden), it disappears or withdraws from us. We deal not withthe tool but with the work we accomplish through it (SZ: 69/99). In practice, however, this totality of worker and work suffers occasional breakdown, from a failure of the tool, a distraction or other circumstances of use. Breakdown then results in a perceptual shift: holistic ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht) becomes particularizing ‘observation’(Ansicht), and the tool, no longer ready-to-hand but ‘present-at-hand’(vorhanden), becomes a separate object with which we can deal analyti-cally, perhaps improvingly, before returning to engaged use. Thus is the genesis of theoretical behaviour out of experiential (SZ:360–1/411–13), when interested engagement with gives way to disinterested contemplation ofthe work." p42
"Winograd and Flores construe the progressive cycle of computing systems development in terms of the see-saw defined by experiential engagement and theoretical detachment. Motivated perhaps by the constructivist perspective of the engineer, they give ‘the fundamental role of breakdown in creating the space of what can be said’ – and so modelled – considerably stronger emphasis than in Heidegger (1986:78). In other words, their reading yields not an applied philosophy butthe beginnings of a philosophical computing, and so access to the centrality of failure and process in the epistemology of modelling." p43
"<p>When it is threatened today by simulation (the threat of vanishing in the play of signs), power risks the real, risks crisis, it gambles on remanufacturing artificial, social, economic, political stakes. This is a question of life or death for it. But it is too late.
Whence the characteristic hysteria of our time: the hysteria of production and reproduction of the real. The other production, that of goods and commodities, that of <i>la belle epoque</i> of political economy, no longer makes any sense of it's own, and has not for some time. What society seeks through production, and overproduction, is the restoration of the real which escapes it.
"There is no doubt that mechanisms of considerable complexity, sufficient for perceptual tasks and the control of organized behaviour, can be created by genetic control of growth and maturation. This is most dramatically evident in the instinctual patterns of insects... The stimulus analyzing mechanisms discovered by Lettvin and associates for frog vision have already been mentioned. In these studies, it is found that certain ganglion cells in the frog retina respond only to contours or strong contrast gradients within their sensory field; others respond only to convex images; others to moving boundaries; and still others to a general dimming of illumination over the entire field. Each of these four cell types transmits it's information to a distinct layer of the frog's tectum, where it's position is mapped topographically. Thus, one layer represents a contour map, or outline drawing of the stimulus field, another represents a location map for small convex objects or corners, a third represents movement vectors, and a fourth indicates regions of dimming illumination." p44
"It is worth noting that most of the specific computing mechanisms used in muscular control appear to be of an analog variety, rather than digital; they make use of instensities and frequencies of activity for the direct control of servo-systems, rather than computing a control formula from encoded data and then generating the control signal required. The stimulus analyzing mechanism found by Lettvin, however, constitute a sort of digital code, in with stimuls properties are represented by presence or absence of signals from particular neurons. It seems likely, as von Neumann has observed (Ref. 105) that the brain makes extensive use of both digital and analog principles in its operation, and it appears that both types of devices may be genetically determined." p44
"But the specific quality I wish to probe goes further than externality to the <i>independence</i> of the model and the modeller <i>from each other</i>. The independence of the modeller is a straight forward though crucial affair, as we have seen. It is, crucially, measured by the apophatic difference between what he or she knows, on the one hand, and can implement computationally, on the other. The independence of the model would seem, however, an altogether problematic notion. It claims more than objectivity, i.e. impartiality or detachment. Rather it answers to recent deconstructions of an absolute objectivity, in science, medicine, commerce and other areas, by asking how far we can take the idea of a (semi-)autonomous intentional artifact." p46-47
"Consider, for example, fictions whose duration is measured in decades to millennia, such as fundamental operating system design,the graphical user interface for human-computer interaction, Northrop Frye’s archetypes of literature, Galilean science, great literature and the cultural envelopes of mythology. These, in varying ways and to varying degrees, show the independence of the fictional in their ability to create imaginative spaces that become the reality within which people live productively and create other fictions. (The fate of those
whose mythology has been destroyed by cultural collision does not undercut this reality, rather redefines what we mean by ‘real’.) In the present case, for modelling, my point is that questioning moves on from the ground solidified in the results provided by models. This solidified ground is what we call ‘real’. " p48-49
"Because copyright law decisively contribues to this unfavourable economic situation, it diminishes the incentive <i>for translators</i> to invest in translation projects." p48
"Yet the exclusive translation right given to authors means that it is customarily they (or publishers as their assignees) who initiate translations in an effort to sell licenses and create foreign language markets for their works, and so they sell licenses and create foreign-language markets for their works, and so they directly approach foreign publishers, who then commission translators." p48
"Current copyright law, then, ensures that translation projects will be driven by publishers, not by translators." p48
"As a result, publishers shape cultural developments at home and abroad. Seeking the maximum returns for their investments, they are more likely to publish domestic works that are also publishable in foreign countries, yet are not so culturally specific as to resist or complicate translation." p48
"Translation discredits the legal institutions that maintain this situation by exposing a basic contradiction in their aims and operations. In diminishing the translator's incentive for investment, copyright law deviates from its "traditional goals" of encouraging and rewarding creative efforts (Bently 1993: 495). The law now curtails creativity in translation, the invention of translation projects and methods, as well as the creativity in literature that is inspired by the availability of foreign works in inventive translations."" p49
"These alternatives from the past can be useful in challenging the present legal status of translation. They make clear that the historical development of an exclusive authorial copyright coincides with, and indeed depends on, the emergence of a Romantic concept of original authorship that negates the translator's work. But they also enable the formulation of a different concept of authorship, one in which the translator is seen as a species of author, and originality is revised to embrace diverse writing practices. What I shall present here is a genealogy of copyright that contests the cultural assumptions of the law and aims to foster legislative reform designed to further both the interests of translators and the practice of translation." p49
"It is generally agreed, simply on the basis of definition, that whatever we call 'memory' involves a modification of neural activity in the central nervous system or its output signals, as a function of exposure to previous events or 'experience'." p53
"While it is not implausible to assume that the surrounding medium participates in the memory trace structure, it seems likely that such interaction between medium and neurons would be highly localized, probably influencing only a single neuron or synaptic junction, rather than forming a widespread organized structure independent of the neurons themselves." p55
"When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased." p62
"The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it "material," it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract." p66
"Systems which represent information internally, in such a way that it can be utilized for the control of certain kinds of responses (such as running, thinking, or talking) will be called <i>cognitive</i> with respect to the realm of information which is represented and the class of responses which this information controls... Thus the representation of information in the form of an image on the retina is not sufficient to permit us to say whether or not the organism is cognitive with respect to its visual environment; we must also demonstrate that this information is accessible to the organism for the control of some specified set of responses." p66
"From an operational point of view, the fact of 'consciousness' is closely connected with the accessibility of information and its ability to influence overt behavior; it is, in fact, meaningless to say that an individual is 'conscious' unless there is something that he is conscious <i>of</i>... All we can say, in the last analysis, is that the system acts <i>as if</i> it were conscious, leaving the question of the actual <i>existence</i> of consciousness in the system for metaphysicists to consider." p66
"Tools turn out to be damaged, their material unsuitable…When we discover it’s unusability, the thing becomes conspicuous…Useful things become ‘things’ in the sense of what one would like to throw away… Similarly, when something at hand is missing whose everyday presence was so much a matter of course that we never even paid attention to it, this constitutes a breach in the context of references discovered in our circumspection. Circumspection comes up with emptiness and now sees for the first time what the missing thing was at hand for and at hand with." p68-70
"Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the semiological process; that is why language, the most complex and universal of all systems of expression, is also the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the master-pattern for all branches of semiology although language is only one particular semiological system." p68
"As indicated above, a pure generalization experiment is one in which the brain model, or perceptron, is required to transfer a selective response from one stimulus (say, a square on the left side of the retina) to a 'similar' stimulus which activates none of the same sensory points (a square on the right side of the retina)... As in the case of discrimination experiments, it is possible to study either <i>spontaneous generalization</i>, in which the criteria for similarity are not suppliee by an outside agency or experimenter, or <i>forced generalization</i>, in which the experimenter's concept of similarity is 'taught' by means of a suitable training procedure. Some of the most significant problems in brain mechanisms concern generalization phenomena, and particularly the meaning of 'similarity' for a particular kind of system." p69
"The ultimate test for a brain model, from the standpoint of pyschological validity, is an experiment of this type, in which the model correctly predicts phenomena which have yet to be discovered in biological systems." p78
"This is not to say that translation can ever rid itself of its fundamental domestication, its basic task of rewriting the foreign text in domestic cultural terms. The point is rather that a translator can choose to redirect the ethnocentric movement of translation so as to decenter the domestic terms that a translation project must inescapably utilize. This is an ethics of difference that can change the domestic culture." p82
"A translation practice that rigorously redirects its ethnocentrism is likely to be subversive of domestic ideologies and institutions. It too would form a cultural identity, but one that is simultaneously critical and contingent, constantly assessing the relations between a domestic culture and its foreign others and developing translation projects solely on the basis of changing assessments. This identity will be truly intercultural, not merely in the sense of straddling two cultures, domestic and foreign, but crossing the cultural borders among domestic audiences (cf. Pym 1993). And it will be historical, distinguishing an awareness of domestic as well as foreign cultural traditions, including traditions of translation." p84
"A translation project can deviate from domestic norms to signal the foreignness of the foreign text and create a readership that is more open to linguistic and cultural differences - yet without resorting to stylistic experiments that are so estranging as to be self-defeating. The key factor is the translator's ambivalence toward domestic norms and the institutional practices in which they are implemented, a reluctance to identify completely with them coupled with a determination to address diverse cultural constituencies, elite and popular. In attempting to straddle the foreign and domestic cultures as well as domestic readerships, a translation practice cannot fail to produce a text that is a potential source of cultural change." p87
"A pedagogy of translated literature can help students learn to be both self critical and critical of exclusionary cultural ideologies by drawing attention to the stituatedness of texts and interpretations. Translations are always intelligible to, if not intentionally made for, specific cultural consitutuencies at specific historical moments. The repression of translation makes ideas and forms appear to be free-floating, unmoored from history, transcending the linguistic and cultural differences that required not merely their translation in the first place, but also their interpretation in a classroom. The effort to reconstruct the period in which the foreign text was produced, to create a historical context for interpretation, does not so much compensate for the loss of historicity as a complicate and exacerbate it: students are encouraged to regard their historical interpretations as immanent in the texts, not determined by translation discourses and critical methodologies that answer to the cultural values of different, later moments. As a result, students develop a concept of interpretative truth as a simple adequacy to the text, ignoring the fact that they are actively constituting it by selecting and synthesizing textual evidence and historical research, and that therefore their interpretation is shaped by linguistic and cultural constraints - which include their reliance on a translation. Recognizing a text as translated and figuring this recognition into classroom interpretations can teach students that their critical operations are limited and provisional, situated in a changing history of reception, in a specific cultural situation, in a curriculum, in a particular language. And with the knowledge of limitations comes the awareness of possibilities, different ways of understanding the foreign text, different ways of understanding their own cultural moments." p93
"<p>The two parts of linguistics respectively, as defined, will be the object of our study.
</p><p><i>Synchronic linguistics</i> will be concerned with the logical and psychological relations that bind together coexisting terms and for a system in the collective mind of speakers.
</p><p><i>Diachronic linguistics</i>, on the contrary, will study relations that bind together successive terms not perceived by the collective mind but substituted for each other without forming a system.
"The remainder is pedagogically useful because it can be perceived in the translation itself, in the various textual effects released in the target language. It enables a close reading of translations <i>as translations</i>, as texts that simultaneously communicate and inscribe the foreign text with domestic values. Hence, this reading is also historical: the remainder becomes intelligible in a translation only when its diverse discourses, registers, and styles are situated in specific moments of the domestic culture." p99
"The temporal aspect of the remainder is perhaps most dramatically revealed when several translations of a single foreign text are juxtaposed. Multiple versions bring to light the different translation effects possible at different cultural moments, allowing these effects to be studied as forms of reception affiliated with different cultural constituencies." p99
"<p>But here is the paradox: on the one hand the concept seems to be the counterpart of the sound-image, and on the other hand the sign itself is in turn the counterpart of the other signs of language.
Language is a system of interdependant terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others, as in the diagram:
"The remainder in a translation demonstrates, with varying degrees of violence to the foreign text and the target language, that the philosophical project of concept formation is fundamentally determeind by its linguistic and cultural conditions. Translation remains the dark secret of philosophy precisely because the remainder shatters the bedrock assumption of this project in its modern academic form: the stability and authority of the philosophical subject as the autonomous agent of reflection." p115
"<p>Since translating can communicate only by reconstituting the foreign text, a translator can choose to judge a translation good when it signifies the linguistic and cultural difference of that text for domestic constituencies. The ethical value of this difference resides in alerting the reader that a process of domestication has taken place in the translating, but also in preventing that process from slipping into an unreflective assimilation to dominant domestic values. Foreign philosophies can retain their difference in translation when they differ to some extent from those that currently dominate the discipline at home, or when they are translated so as to differe from prevailing domestic interpretations of their concepts and discourses. The best philosophical translating is itself philosophical in forming a concept of the foreign text based on an assessment of the domestic scene. But if the philosophy of the translating values difference, the concept will be defamiliarizing, not based on a ratification of that scene.
The translator's responsibility is not just twofold, both foreign and domestic, but split into two opposing obligations: to establish a lexicographical equivalence for a conceptually dense text, while intelligibly maintaining its foreignness to domestic readerships. Translating motivated by an ethics of difference seeks to inform domestic readers of foreign philosophies, but also to provoke them into new thinking.
"For the translation of philosophy, the most important factor in this development is the experimentalism. Heidegger's translators created an equivalence that tampered with current usage, whereby they didn't just communicate his difficult concepts, but practiced them through various discursive strategies." p119
"In the syntagm a term acquires its value only because it stands in opposition to everything that precedes or follows it or to both." p123
"<p>Also under control are the fibers that lead from the sensory areas into the association areas. According to the schema of perception, this control is extended gradually, synapse by synapse. Considering the association areas as made up of a population of transmission units, two factors must affect the length of time needed to bring all these units under control. One is the number of controlling fibers leading from sensory areas into association areas. The second is the number of transmission units in the association areas themselves.
<i>With cortex of a given size</i>, these two factors may be considered to be roughly proportional to the size of the total sensory cortex, and the total association cortex. It then follows that the length of the primary learning period will be roughly proportional to the ratio
total association cortex / total sensory cortex
""Because I came to digital humanities and speculative computing from the visual arts and contemporary art history, aesthetics was central to my approach to electronic media. This let to the conviction that the purpose of work in new media is to continue the longer porject of fine art: to provide embodied expressions of experience and knowledge." p127-128
"Aesthesis focuses on the generative perception and cognitive production of information and it's material expressions in any medium. Aesthesis is distinct from the analysis of representation, but is dependent on recognition of the cultural and historical characteristics of visual forms, their materiality, and the rhetorical assumptions built into formal expressions of knowledge." p128
"Therefore, the papers grouped here begin with an argument for graphesis in which I suggest that the visual creation of information provides a counterpoint to mathesis, the assumption that all human thought might be able to be properly represented in a formal language." p128
"By introducing the term <i>situation</i>, as opposed to <i>system</i>, I'm emphasizing the codependent relation of user and network in conditions of use." p130
"The various misperceptions of digital media as lacking materialiality [sic] gain some of their credibility through connection to a tradition that idealizes the immaterial, even placing it in a theological frame, above embodied knowledge. The argument that code is <i>material</i>, however, seems incontrovertible. Digital code may be relatively unstable with regard to the bond between inscription and configured form (by contrast to a letter carved in stone, for instance), but the pattern of stored values on a silicon chip is ineluctably physical." p134
"Husserl even suggests that the peculiar specificity of geometric forms is that, although they become conventionalized within representational system, the original condition of their existence is independent of human constructs. Because mathematical forms have a claim to objective, universal status, even if their authority varies in cultural circumstances, Husserl's decision to focus on geometry makes his discussion appropriate to current mythologies in which the cultural authority of mathesis is supported.
"If, following Husserl, geometric forms exist independent of human perception and are not chagned by that perception from their ideal form, then does that ideality necessarily fall into the category of "self-identity" or "unity" of form? The idea of self-identity is anathema to Adorno, who argues that when empirical or positivist logic invades culture to such an extent that representation appears to present a unitary truth, there can be little or no room for the critical agency essential to any political action." p135
"These two positions provide the poles of reference on which I examine the premises by which mathesis functions in current conceptions of digital data. I suggest that there is an underlying, at times overt, ideological bias in the way the myth of digital code is conceived in the public imagination. Because mathematical forms of knowledge are presumed to lie outside of ideology, this conception validates digital representation in a way that forecloses interrogation." p135-136
"I suggest the possibility of critical cultural agency is linked to the assertion that the real materiality of code should replace the imagined ideality of code." p136
"The manifestation into substance, the instation of form into matter, is what allows some thing, any thing, to be available to sentience. Ideas are apprehended through expressions (the illusory transparency of language as a means of expression often renders this invisible in common perception)." p139
"But we see from these examples that form is constitutive of information, not its transparent presentation. And no constituted expression exists independent of the circumstances of its production and reception." p139
"What is at stake in asserting the authority of graphesis - the material expression of form as the condition of its existence - is not the viability of code that has no graphic manifestation, but the fact that it is stored materially. Code is not an immaterial ideal. This in itself calls the mythic status of the digital as the realization of mathesis into question." p141
"It [code] functions as a temporarily fixed and infinitely mutable sequence that always refers to a place within the structure of the machine. As a binary sequence, code is always constituted as substantive difference, not simply metaphysical <i>diffÃ©rance</i>, and is part of the topographic structure of the computer's configured spaces and mapped territory. As computer historian RenÃ© Moreau said has said, "No item of information can have any existence in the machine unless there is some device in which physical representation can be held." Code is material, and its materiality has implications at every level of inscription and display, as well as for its role in accounting for configuration as information." p157
"Studying the white space in a page of William Morris's Kelmscott <i>Cantebury Tales</i> offers an exemplary opportunity for such a reconsideration. The unprinted area here is not a given, inert and neutral space, but an <i>espace</i>, or field, in which forces among mutually consititutive elements make themselves available to be read. The same observation applies to the garden-variety encounters of daily reading. Any page or screen is divided into text blocks and margins, with line space, letterspace, space between page number and margin, and so on. Areas of white space each have their own quality or character, as if they marked variations in atmospheric pressure in different parts of a graphic microclimate. "White" space is thus visually inflected, given a tonal value through relations rather than according to some intrinsic property." p162
"Transnationalism depends not only on foreign markets, but on the effectiveness of local translations to compete in those markets, a cultural dependence that enforces new forms of authorship (corporate) and of publishing (tie-ins) to strengthen the bottom line." p165
"The translation practices enlisted by transnational corporations, whether publishers, manufacturers, or advertising agencies, function in the same fundamental ways as those that underwrote European colonialism. The main difference is that translation now serves corporate capital instead of a nation state, a trading company, or an evangelical program. What remains unchanged is the use of translation practices that establish a heirarchical relationship between the major and minor languages, between the hegemonic and subordinate cultures. The translations enact a process of identity formation in which colonizer and colonized, transnational corporation and indigenous consumer, are positioned unequally." p165
"And yet a subordinate position in the global economy must not be seen as passive submission. Under colonizing regimes the functions of translation a extremely diverse and unpredictable in effect, always allowing the colonized the discursive space to evade or tamper with the discriminatory stereotypes imposed on them." p165
"Testing those claims against the gadgets themselves, however, on encounters a field fraught with contradictions. Electronic presentations often mimic the kitchiest elements of book iconography, while potentially useful features of electronic functionality are excluded." p166
"Rather than thinking about simulating the way a book <i>looks</i>, then, designers might do well to consider extending the ways a book <i>works</i>." p166
"Rather than relying on a literal reading of book "metaphors" grounded in a formal iconography of the codex, we should instead look to scholarly and artistic practices for insight into ways the programmatic function of the traditional codex has been realized." p169
"Other substantive changes, famously noted by medievalist Malcolm Parkes, came as reading habits were transformed, and when monastic approaches were replaced by scholastic attitudes toward texts in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries, bringing about dramatic changes in format. In earlier usage, books were the basis for linear, silent reading of sacred texts, punctuated by periods of contemplative prayer. These habits gave way to the study and creation of argument as the influence of Aristotle on medieval thought brought about increased attention to rhetoric and the structure of knowledge. Readers began to see the necessity to create metatextual structures for purposes of analysis." p170-171
"Argument, not reading, is the purpose to which such works are put, and their formal features are designed to provide a reader with both a schematic overview and the means to use the work in rhetorical activity.
"Using a book for prayer is clearly an active engagement with the text. But the linear, sequential reading style did not require any extra apparatus as a guide. The development of graphical features that abstract the book's contents thus reflect a radical change in attitudes toward knowledge. Ordered, hierarchical, with an analytical synthesis of contents, the artifact that arose as the instrument of scholastic <i>lectio</i> was a new type of book. Readers came to rely on multiple points of access and the search capabilities offered by metatextual apparatus.
"The important point here is not just that format features have their origin within specific reading practices but that they are functional, not merely formal. The significant principle is relevant to all reading practices: that the visual hierarchy and use of space and color don't simply reference or reflect an existing hierarchy in a text, they make it, producing the structure through the graphical performance. Such approaches seems self-evident because they are so familiar to us as conventions. But conceptualizing the book in terms of its paratextual apparatus required a leap from literal, linear reading to the spatialized abstraction of an analytic metastructure. Differentiating and identifying various parts of a codex went hand in hand with the recognition of separate functions for these elements. Function gives rise to form, and form sustains functional activity as a program that arises from its structure." p171
Tutuola's authorship was not self-originating or individualistic but derivative and collective, characterized by an elaboration of the various oral and literary traditions available to an uneducated Nigerian writer under British rule.
Tutuola's translating likewise prevents his narratives from being described as an expression of cultural authenticity, whether from a Eurocentric standpoint that prasies them for representing the "true macabre energy of Africa" (Lindfors, 1975:30) or from an Afrocentric one that criticizes their lapse from "folk purity" (Bishop 1988: 75). For despite Tutuola's reliance on Yoruba folklore and literature, the calquing never rendered a specific Yoruba text; no purely indigenous original existed behind Tutuola's eccentric English. In fact, the lexical and syntactical peculiarities indicate that Yoruba was <i>already</i> a heterogenous language containing English borrowings.
"These diverse effects and functions bring a new complexity to a translation ethics that takes as its ideal the recognition of cultural difference. If domesticating strategies of choosing and translating foreign texts are considered ethically questionable - a narcissistic dismissal of foreignness in favor of dominant domestic values - minority situations redefine what constitutes the 'domestic' and the 'foreign.' These two categories are variable, always reconstructed in a translation project vis-a-vis the local scene." p187
"<p>There is considerable variety in the make-up of central neural cells and their reaction to changes of blood content...
Now it has been seen that neural integration is fundamentally a question of timing, quite apart from the particular theory of integration that has been developed on these pages. Metabolic changes, by altering time relations in neural firing, must tend to disrupt behaviour-not merely slow it up, but disorganize it.
In the present theory, timing has its effect in the functioning of the cell-assembly and the interrelation of assemblies: diffuse, anatomically irregular structures that function briefly as closed systems, and do so only by virtue of the time relations in the firing of constituent cells. Synaptic changes are necessary to the setting up of an assembly, but these act by coordinating the action of two or more cells. The firing of one cell immediately after another is not determined by synaptic knobs alone but also by what is going on in some other cell or cells. Synaptic knobs alone cannot determine that a particular system will function as such.
Furthermore, an individual cell or transmission unit may enter into more than one assembly, at different times. Which is will form part of, at any moment, depends on timing in other cells; and to enter into any assembly requires that its frequency accord with the time properties of the active system.
"In each of it's applications, it [Bentham's panopticon] makes it possible to perfect the exercise of power. It does this in several ways: because it can reduce the number of those who exercise it, while increasing the number of those on whom it is exercised." p206
"Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies." p217
"<p>Two qualifying remarks by way of conclusion. First, the idea that thinking is reducible to primitives or fundamental modules is philosophically controversial, challenged on the one hand by Heideggerian phenomenology, vigorously and variously pursued on the other by analytic philosophers and linguists. In humanities computing we should at least be clear that we are modelling thinking, however subversive of the entire project that may be. Second, much can be and has been done, at least in the analysis stage, with existing software. Very little of the agenda sketched above needs to wait on the tools we would have. Indeed, deferral is, as I have noted, a perilous trap.
In summary form I have argued for the following agenda items:
(1) Discover, confirm and exemplify how computing affects analysis, so that the basic case for humanities computing is clear and persuasive across the disciplines.
(2) Explore the realization of scholarly forms in the digital medium,attempting both the historical achievements of print as these remain desirable and the potential of the digital medium to implement new theoretical designs.
(3) Identify and cultivate kinships with the disciplines, so that humanities computing is informed by the collective ways of knowing they have cultivated.
(4) Redefine both ‘scholarship’ and ‘publication’ in theory and practice so as to include all of the work within the purview of the field, particularly with respect to software.
(5) Develop as a prevalent habit and as a serious, essential aspect of work the strongly conversational mode of scholarly publication exemplified by Humanist and other Internet forums.
(6) Write the ethnography of collaborative engagements to document how successful collaborations happen and how perceptions change in the encounter of the humanities with computing.
(7) Develop a genuine historiography of humanities computing from existing chronologies; begin writing histories of the field.
(8) Cultivate and exercise the ability to explain the essentials of humanities computing to non-specialist colleagues and to the general public
(9) Devise appropriate bibliographic mechanisms and online publishing habits; change the notion of cumulative scholarship in the field so that a bibliographic imperative can realistically be followed.
(10)Propose and investigate programmable scholarly primitives for the construction of better tools.
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that any agenda we might construct for humanities computing, including the above, will to a significant degree be (a) incomplete and (b) partially dependent on the priorities of the disciplines in its purview. Allow me to summarize these qualities and then to speculate on where an incomplete, partly dependent agenda might lead us. Incompleteness, I have argued, follows from the inadequacy of the concept ‘problem’ (in the sense that agendas have them) to capture the humanistic aspects of what its practitioners do. Humanists problematize, but not to make or discover that which is to be solved. Rather the aim is to recontextualize or renew understanding of the stubborn, recurrent ‘problems’ that are more the fabric of post-Edenic life than rips in it we may hope to mend. Of course solvable problems occur and are solved meanwhile, but they are incidental to the main purpose. Hence, however we construe the work of the humanities, including that of humanities computing, it cannot be cleanly resolved into an agenda. Dependency of the agenda on external objectives is a necessary consequence of interdisciplinarity as I have defined it. Denied (which is to say, liberated from) both ownership and boundedness of its area of operations, humanities computing cannot turn to any of the common geopolitical metaphors. There is no way of saying precisely where the ‘field’ stops and something else begins, who owns or belongs to it and who does not.
"The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced… Since the historical testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardized by reproduction when substantive duration ceases to matter… One might generalise by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition…These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition…" p221
"The work has a meaning for other wills; it can serve another and eventually turn against its author… The historical distance which makes this historiography, this violence, this subjection possible is proportionate to the time necessary for the will to lose its work completely. Historiography recounts the way the survivors appropriate the works of dead wills to themselves; it rests on the usurpation carried out by the conquerors, that is, by the survivors; it recounts enslavement, forgetting the life that struggles against slavery." p228
"The recent development of various methods of modulation such as reM
and PPM which exchange bandwidth for signal-to-noise ratio has intensified
the interest in a general theory of communication. A basis for
such a theory is contained in the important papers of Nyquist! and Hartley"
on this subject. In the present paper we will extend the theory to include a
number of new factors, in particular the effect of noise in the channel, and
the savings possible due to the sta tistiral structure of the original message
and due to the nature of the final destination of the information.
The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at
one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another
point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are
correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual
entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the
engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is
one selected from a set of possible messages. The system must be designed
to operate for each possible selection, not just the one which will actually
be chosen since this is unknown at the time of design." p379
"<p>By a communication system we will mean a system of the type indicated
schematically in Fig. 1. It consists of essentially five parts:
1. An information source which produces a message or sequence of messages
to be communicated to the receiving terminal...
2. A transmitter which operates on the message in some way to produce a
signal suitable for transmission over the channel.
3. The channel is merely the medium used to transmit the signal from
transmitter to receiver.
4. The receiver ordinarily performs the inverse operation of that done by
the transmitter, reconstructing the message from the signal.
5. The destination is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended.
"We can think of a discrete source as generating the message, symbol by symbol. It will choose successive symbols accoring to certain probabilities depending, in general, on preceding choices as well as the particular symbols in question." p385
"A more complicated structure is obtained if successive symbols are not chosen independently but their probabilities depend on preceding letters." p386
"<p>Second-Order Word Approximation. The word transition probabilities are correct but no further structure is included.
</p><p>THE HEAD AND IN FRONTAL ATTACK ON AN ENGLISH
</p><p>WRITER THAT THE CHARACTER OF THIS POINT IS
</p><p>THEREFORE ANOTHER METHOD FOR THE LETTERS
</p><p>THAT THE TIME OF WHO EVER TOLD THE PROBLEM
</p><p>FOR AN UNEXPECTED
</p><p>The resemblance to ordinary English text increases quite noticeably at each of the above steps. Note that these samples have reasonably good
structure out to about twice the range that is taken into account in their construction. Thus in (3) the statistical process insures reasonable text
for two-letter sequence, but four-letter sequences from the sample can usually be fitted into good sentences.
"<p>We have represented a discrete information source as a Markoff process.
Can we define a quantity which will measure, in some sense, how much information
is "produced" by such a process, or better, at what rate information
Suppose we have a set of possible events whose probabilities of occurrence
are PI , P2 , ... , P3 These probabilities are known but that is all we know
concerning which event will occur. Can we find a measure of how much
"choice" is involved in the selection of the event or of how uncertain we are
of the outcome?
"Quantities of the form H = - Σp<sub>i</sub> log p<sub>i</sub> (the constant K merely amounts
to a choice of a unit of measure) play a central role in information theory as
measures of information, choice and uncertainty. The form of H will be
recognized as that of entropy as defined in certain formulations of statistical
mechanics where p<sub>i</sub> is the probability of a system being in cell <i>i</i> of its phase
space. <i>H</i> is then, for example, the H in Boltzmann's famous H theorem.
We shall call H = - ΣP<sub>i</sub> log P<sub>i</sub> the entropy of the set of probabilities" p393
"The ratio of the entropy of a source to the maximum value it could have
while still restricted to the same symbols will be called its relative ell/ropy.
This is the maximum compression possible when we encode into the same
alphabet. One minus the relative entropy is the redundancy. The redundancy of ordinary English, not considering statistical structure over greater
distances than about eight letters is roughly 50%. This means that when
we write English half of what we write is determined by the structure of the
language and half is chosen freely. The figure 50% was found by several
independent methods which all gave results in this neighborhood. One is
by calculation of the entropy of the approximations to English. A second
method is to delete a certain fraction of the letters from a sample of English
text and then let someone attempt to restore them. If they can be restored
when 50% are deleted the redundancy must be greater than 50%.
A third method depends on certain known results in cryptography.
Two extremes of redundancy in English prose are represented by Basic
English and by James Joyces' book "Finigans Wake." The Basic English
vocabulary is limited to 850 words and the redundancy is very high. This
is reflected in the expansion that occurs when a passage is translated into
Basic English. Joyce on the' other hand enlarges the vocabulary and is
alleged to achieve a compression of semantic content.
The redundancy of a language is related to the existence of crossword
puzzles. If the redundancy is zero any sequence of letters is a reasonable
text in the language and any two dimensional array of letters forms a crossword
puzzle, If the redundancy is too high the language imposes too
many constraints for large crossword puzzles to be possible. A more detailed
analysis shows that if we assume the constraints imposed by the
language are of a rather chaotic and random nature, large crossword puzzles
are just possible when the redundancy is 50%. If the redundancy is 33%,
three dimensional crossword puzzles should be possible, etc." p398-399
"The input to the
transducer is a sequence of input symbols and its output a sequence of output
symbols. The transducer may have an internal memory so that its
output depends not only on the present input symbol but also on the past
history. We assume that the internal memory is finite, i.e. there exists
a finite number 111 of possible states of the transducer and that its output is
a function of the present state and the present input symbol. The next
state will be a second function of these two quantities." p399
"If the channel is noisy it is not in general possible to reconstruct the original
message or the transmitted signal with certainty by any operation on the
received signal E. There are, however, ways of transmitting the information
which are optimal in combating noise. This is the problem which we now
"An approximation to the ideal would have the property that if the signal
is altered in a reasonable way by the noise, the original can still be recovered.
Tn other words the alteration will not in general bring it closer to another
reasonable signal than the original. This is accomplished at the cost of a
certain amount of redundancy in the coding. The redundancy must be
introduced in the proper way to combat the particular noise structure
involved. However, any redundancy in the source will usually help if it is
utilized at the receiving point. In particular, if the source already has a
certain redundancy and no attempt is made to eliminate it in matching to the
channel, this redundancy will help combat noise. For example, in a noiseless
telegraph channel one could save about 50% in time by proper encoding of
the messages. This is not done and most of the redundancy of English
remains in the channel symbols. This has the advantage, however, of
allowing considerable noise in the channel. A sizable fraction of the letters
can be received incorrectly and still reconstructed by the context." p414
"The problem of motivation for perceptrons, considered as models for biological nervous systems, has hardly been treated adequately up to this time. The reinforcement control system, which forms part of the experimental system, plays the role of a sort of <i>deus ex machina</i>, which not only has knowledge of right and wrong responses, but can control the distribution of reinforcement to individual R-units in the perceptron, as required. A more 'natural' system with only a slight reduction of efficiency does seem to be possible, however, although at present the model proposed is a heuristic one, on which no quantitative analysis has been completed.
The proposed model for biological reinforcement mechanisms is illustrated in Figure 72. In this system, the r.c.s. is no longer external to the system, but is essentially part of the perceptron. It is assumed that the perceptron system includes a sensing device for a physiological condition which has been arbitrarily called the 'discomfort level', measured by the variable D. This might be compared to Ashby's concept of 'essential variables'. In addition to continuously measuring the variable D, which is assumed for simplicity to be some function of the current stimulus pattern, a second mechanism (readily represented by a neuron with inhibitory input connections with a short time delay and excitatory connections with a longer time delay, both originating from the 'D-detector') responds to a negative dD/dt. The corrections to this system are random perturbations applied either to active connections, or to all connections of the perceptrong; the increments, however, take the form of 'elastic perturbations', so that the connections tend to decay back to their previous values unless a 'positive reinforcement' occurs to 'fix' the new values. Thus negative reinforcement applies a slight random perturbation, which tends to disappear unless it actually proves helpful, in which case it is stabilized by a positive reinforcement." p571
For this system to function efficiently, it is again necessary to assume some degree of temporal continuity in the environment, so that the change in D indicates a true improvement in the response of the system, rather than an irrelevant change due to a sudden alternation of the environment. Preliminary simulation experiments to evaluate this scheme are now in progress, employing the Burroughs 220 computer, and indicate that the system shoudl work with a reasonable degree of efficiency, as compared to a system employing a more deterministic error correction procedure. The results of these experiments will be reported as soon as the data are complete." p572
"Stated in simplest terms, our objective has been to discover a physical system, or abstract model, which will be capable of "perceiving" its environment, and learning to recognize those objects or events which i shas perceived in the past. However, since it is our purpose to understand the actual mechanisms employed by the brain, rather than simply to construct a new type of comptuing device, the perceptron models are constrained in their organization and dynamic properties by what is known of the biological nervous system. Rather than attempting to 'invent' or 'construct' a machine which will calculate such things as similarities or geometrical properties of stimuli, the approach has been to begin with a hypothetical network of idealized neurons, or nerve cells, resembling the brain in its general organization, and then analyze the system mathematically to determine whether or not it possesses 'psychological' properties of interest. Where the model is found to deviate markedly from the behaviour of biological systems, modifications are suggested, and the new model that results is subjected to the same sort of analysis. In this fashion, it is hoped that the necessary conditions for a system to 'perceive' in the same manner as the brain can be abstracted." p574
"It has been shown that as the topological organization of the perceptron increases in complexity, new psychological properties emerge. The principle results can be summarized as follows:
(1) A network consisting of less than three layers of signal transmission units, or a network consisting exclusively of linear elements connected in series, is incapable of learning to discriminate classes of patterns in an isotropic environment (where any pattern can occur in all possible retinal locations, without boundary effects).
(2) A three-layer series-coupled perceptron is a minimal system capable of learning to discriminate arbitrary classes of stimulus patterns or stimulus sequences. Any discrimination problem can, in principle, be solved by such a system, and any arbitrary response function can be assigned to the stimuli of a given universe.
(3) ..." p575
"The most important technological development which may be inherent in the future development of brain models, would be the provision of 'eyes and ears' for conventional computers and automata, giving them a common universe of discourse with their operators. Currecnt attempts at heuristic problem-solving programs (such as Newell and Simon's programs) and at automatic language translation, are hampered by a lack of common referents for symbols, which can be no more than code-numbers for the computer, but which have a wealth of associated meanings for the operator. The development of a system which, by virtue of a shared sensory experience, can 'comprehend' the nature of the physical referents in a descriptive statement, is probably a necessary first step to the creation of a truly useful problem-solving computer. Linguistic capability, related to perceptual experience, is of the essence for an "intelligent" system, artificial or otherwise." p583-584
"The theoretical approach presented in this volume is clearly a long way from an adequate "explanation" of the foundations of human experience. The work will have fulfilled an important purpose, however, if it has succeeded in conveying a recognition of the potential power of mathematical study of neurodynamic systems, not only for understanding the physical mechanisms of the brain itself, but for comprehending the relationship of the cognitive process in man to the nature of the environment in which it occurs." p583
"Aristotle declares that slavery would cease to be necessary if only the shuttles and plectrums could set themselves going on their own. The idea accords admirably with his definition of the slave as animated instrument….By the same token, the ancient poet Pherecydes of Syros had told how the Dactyls, after building a new house for Zeus had fashioned for him male and female servants as well. We are in the realm of fable…. Yet before three centuries have passed, an Anthology poet, Antiphilos of Byzantium, offers a response to Aristotle by singing of the invention of the water mill, which liberates women from the arduous task of grinding: ‘Spare the hand that grinds the corn, O miller girles, and softly sleep. Let Chanticleer announce the morn in vain! Demeter has commanded that the girls’ work be done by Nymphs, and now they skip lightly over the wheels, so that the shaken axles revolve with their spokes and pull round the load of revolving stones. Let us live the life of our fathers, and let us rest from work and enjoy the gifts that Demeter sends us." p697
"For this writer, the perceptron program is <i>not</i> primarily concerned with the invention of devices for 'artificial intelligence', but rather with investigating the physical structures and neurodynamic principles which underlie 'natural intelligence'. A perceptron is first and foremost a brain model, not an invention for pattern recognition. As a brain model, its utility is in enabling us to determine the physical conditions for the emergence of various psychological properties."